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1 Abstract
Complex socioeconomic networks such as information, finance and even terrorist networks need resilience
to cascades - to prevent the failure of a single node from causing a far-reaching domino effect. We show
that terrorist and guerrilla networks are uniquely cascade-resilient while maintaining high efficiency, but
they become more vulnerable beyond a certain threshold. We also introduce an optimization method for
constructing networks with high passive cascade resilience. The optimal networks are found to be based
on cells, where each cell has a star topology. Counterintuitively, we find that there are conditions where
networks should not be modified to stop cascades because doing so would come at a disproportionate
loss of efficiency. Implementation of these findings can lead to more cascade-resilient networks in many
diverse areas. Keywords: complex networks, resilience, cascade, multi-objective optimization, epidemics
on networks, terrorist networks.
2 Introduction
Cascades are ubiquitous in complex networks and they have inspired much research in modeling, predic-
tion and mitigation [1–10]. For example, since many infectious diseases spread over contact networks a
single carrier might infect other individuals with whom she interacts. The infection might then propagate
widely through the network, leading to an epidemic. Even if no lives are lost, recovery may require both
prolonged hospitalizations and expensive treatments. Similar cascade phenomena are found in other
domains such as power distribution systems [11–13], computer networks such as ad-hoc wireless net-
works [7], financial markets [14, 15] and socio-economic systems [16]. A particularly interesting class are
“dark” or clandestine social networks, such as terrorist networks, guerrilla groups [17], espionage and
crime rings [18,19]. In such networks if one of the nodes (i.e. individuals) is captured by law enforcement
agencies, he may betray all the nodes connected to him leading to their likely capture.
Dark networks are therefore designed to operate in conditions of intense cascade pressure. As such
they might serve as useful prototypes of networks that are cascade-resilient because of their connectivity
structure (topology) alone. Their nodes are often placed in well-defined cells - closely-connected subnet-
works with only sparse connections to the outside (for an example from World War II see Fig. 1) [20].
The advantages of cells are thought to be that the risk from the capture of any person is mostly limited
to his or her cell mates, thereby protecting the rest of the network [21,22]. Modern terrorist groups retain
this cellular structure, but increasingly use networks made of components with no connections between
them, thus caging cascades within each component [23–25].
To represent networks from different domains, this paper will use simple unweighted graphs. This
approach offers simplicity and can employ tools from the well-developed field of graph theory. A sim-
plification is also unavoidable given the lack of data on networks, especially on dark networks where
only the connectivity is known, if that. Ultimately through, models of networks, especially dark net-
works must consider their evolving nature, fuzzy boundaries and multiplicities of node classes and diverse
relationships.
Fortunately, the loss of information involved in representing networks as simple rather than as weighted
graphs could be evaluated. In the Supporting Information section we consider two unusually rich data
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Figure 1. The French World-War II underground network Francs-tireurs et Partisans
(FTP) reconstructed by the author based on the account in [20]. Its organizational unit was
the combat group (A). In an idealized case, nor always followed, this was divided into two “teams” of
three fighters, where leader L1 was in overall command and in command of team 1. His lieutenant, L2,
led team 2 and assumed overall command if L1 was captured. The small degree of the nodes ensured
that the capture of any one node did not risk the exposure of a significant fraction of the organization.
Each “group” is in a command hierarchy (B) where 3 groups (bottom-level nodes) made a “section”, 3
sections made a “company”, and finally 3 companies made a “battalion”.
sets where the edges could be assigned weights. We find that the error in using simple graphs has no
systematic bias and is usually small.
2.1 Evaluating Cascade Resilience of Networks
Our preliminary task is to compare the cascade resilience of networks from different domains. We will see
that dark networks are indeed more successful in the presence of cascades than other complex networks.
Their success stems not from cascade resilience alone but from balancing resilience with efficiency (a
measure of their ability to serve their mission.)
We will consider a particular type of cascade resilience and a particular definition of efficiency. For
resilience we will use a probabilistic process known as “SIR” (susceptible-infected-recovered.) In SIR any
failed (captured) node leads to the failure of each neighboring node independently with probability τ [26].
Using the SIR model, resilience R(G) could be defined as the average fraction of the network that does
not fail in the cascade. Efficiency W (G) is also a function of the connectivity structure, and could be
defined based on the distances between all pairs of nodes in the graph (see the Methods section for exact
expressions.)
Observe that the most cascade-resilient network is the network with no edges (hence no cascades can
propagate), but it is also the least efficient kind of network. It is expected that resilience and efficiency
will be in opposition, requiring trade-offs. Just as disconnected networks are resilient and inefficient,
highly-efficient networks such as densely-connected graphs are likely to have low resilience (for a historic
example see [27].)
Define the overall “fitness”, F (G), of a network by aggregating resilience and efficiency through a
weight parameter r:
F (G) = rR(G) + (1− r)W (G) .
The parameter r depends on the application and represents the cost of restoring the network after a
3cascade - from light (r → 0) to catastrophic (r → 1). It is possible to include in fitness other metrics
such as construction cost.
We will compare the fitnesses of several complex networks, including communication, infrastructure
and scientific networks to the fitnesses of dark networks. The class of dark networks will be represented
by three networks: the 9/11, 11M and FTP networks. The 9/11 network links the group of individuals
who were directly involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC [28].
Similarly the 11M network links those responsible for the March 11, 2004 train attacks in Madrid [23].
Both 9/11 and 11M were constructed from press reports of the attacks. Edges in those networks connect
two individuals who worked with each other in the plots [23, 28]. The FTP network is an underground
group from World War II (Fig. 1), whose network was constructed by the author from a historical
account [20].
Figure 2 shows that the dark networks attain the highest fitness values of all networks, except for
extreme levels of cascade risk (τ > 0.6). This is to be expected: only 11M, 9/11, and the FTP networks
have been designed with cascade resilience as a significant criterion - a property that makes them useful
case studies. For high cascade risks (τ > 0.6) the CollabNet network exceeds the fitnesses of the dark
networks. CollabNet was drawn by linking scientists who co-authored a paper in the area of network
science [29]. It achieved high fitness because it is partitioned into research groups that have no publications
with outside scientists. Like some terrorist networks, it is separated into entirely disconnected cells.
The 9/11 and the 11M networks are very successful for low values of τ (< 0.2), but then rapidly
deteriorate because of a jump in the extent of cascades - the so-called percolation transition [34]. Past
this threshold, cascades start affecting a large fraction of the network, resilience collapses and the fitness
declines rapidly. The pattern of onset of failure can be clearly seen in most of the networks. For violent
secret societies this transition means that the network might be initially hard to defeat, but there is a
point after which efforts against it start to pay off. Because τ is representative of the security environment,
the 9/11 network is found to be relatively ill-adapted to the more stringent security regime implemented
after the attacks. Indeed, it is likely that the 9/11 attacks would have been thwarted under the current
security regime since some of the nodes were captured before the attacks, but not interrogated in time to
discover and apprehend the rest of the network [35]. In contrast, the cellular tree hierarchy of the FTP
network is more suitable for an intermediate range of cascade risks. However, the pair-wise distances in
it are too long to provide high efficiency. Therefore, its fitness is comparatively poor in the very low and
very high values of τ .
3 Designing Networks
The success of dark networks must be due to structural elements of those networks, such as cells. If
identified, those elements could be used to design more resilient networks and to upgrade existing ones.
Thus, by learning how dark networks organize, it will be possible to make networks such as communication
systems, financial networks, and others more resilient and efficient.
Those identification and design problems are our next task. We propose to solve both using an
approach based on discrete optimization. Let a set of graphs G be called a “network design” if all the
networks in it share a structural element. Since dark networks are often based on dense cliques, we
consider a design where all the networks consist of one or multiple cliques. We consider also designs
based on star-like cells, cycle-based cells and more complex patterns (see Fig. 3 and SI for the exact set
of networks.)
In the first step we will find the most successful network within each design. Namely, consider an
optimization problem where the decision variable is the topology G of a simple graph taken from a design
G. The objective is the fitness F (G):
max
G∈G
F (G) . (1)
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Figure 2. Fitnesses of various networks at r = 0.51 and various values of τ . 11M is the network
responsible for the March 11, 2004 attacks in Madrid (70 nodes, 240 edges.) 9/11 [28] is the network
responsible for the 9/11 attacks (62 nodes, 152 edges.) CollabNet [29] is a scientific co-authorship
network in the area of network science (1589 nodes, 2742 edges.) E-Mail [30] is a university’s e-mail
contact network, showing its organizational structure (1133 nodes, 5452 edges.) FTP is the network in
Fig. 1 (174 nodes, 300 edges.) Gnutella [31, 32] is a snapshot of the peer-to-peer network (6301 nodes,
20777 edges.) Internet AS [33] is a snapshot of the Internet at the autonomous system level (26475
nodes, 53381 edges.) Except for τ > 0.6 dark networks (11M, 9/11 and FTP) attain the highest fitness.
In the second step we will compare the fitnesses across designs, thus identifying the topological feature
with the highest fitness (e.g. star vs. clique.)
This optimization problem could be used more broadly: It introduces a method for designing cascade-
resilient networks for applications such as vital infrastructure networks. To apply this to a given applica-
tion, one must make the design G the set of all feasible networks in that domain, to the extent possible
by computational constraints. In the area of terrorist networks, the model is closely related to the
game-theoretic work of Lindelauf et al. [22, 36].
A complementary approach is to consider the multi-objective optimization problem in which R(G)
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Figure 3. Graphs illustrating the 6 network designs. Cliques (A), Stars (B), Cycles (C),
Connected Cliques (D), Connected Stars (E), and Erdos-Renyi “ER” (F). Each design is configured by
just one or two parameters (the number of individuals per cell and/or the random connectivity.) This
enables rapid solution of the optimization problem. In computations the networks were larger (n = 180
nodes.)
and W (G) are maximized simultaneously:
max
G∈G
{R(G),W (G)} . (2)
The multi-objective approach cannot find the optimal network but instead produces the Pareto frontier
of each design - the set of network configurations that cannot be improved without sacrificing either
efficiency or resilience. The decision maker can use the frontier to make the optimal trade-off between
resilience and efficiency.
4 Results
4.1 Optimal Network
The first set of experiments compares the designs against each other under different cascade risks (τ),
Fig. 4. At each setting of τ , each design is optimized to its best configuration, i.e. the best cell size,
and connectivity if applicable. The curves indicate the fitness of the optimal network in each design.
Typically at each τ the optimal network is different from the optimal network at another τ . Observe
that within each design, as τ increases the fitness decreases - one cannot win when fighting cascades, only
delay (see SI for proof.) In certain applications it is possible to invest in reducing the cascade propagation
probability, τ . Then the curves in Fig. 4 could also be viewed as expressing the gain from efforts to reduce
cascades by reducing τ and also adapting the network structure. If the slope is steep then the gains are
large.
Comparing designs to each other reveals that Connected Stars is superior to all others in fitness
(Fig. 4.) The design also outperforms any of the empirical networks in Fig. 2 in part because for each
6Figure 4. Fitness at r = 0.51 of various network designs. The Connected Stars design is the best
design at all cascade risks, τ . Cliques and Connected Cliques are competitive only for extreme ranges of
τ . The superiority of Connected Stars over the ER (random graph) confirms the hypothesis that cells
give fitness gains against cascades. The fitness of a design at each value of τ is defined as the fitness of
the optimal configuration (network ensemble) within that design.
value of τ we selected the optimal network. The simpler Stars design is almost as fit, deteriorating only
at extreme ranges of τ . The rankings of the designs are of course dependent on the parameter values,
but not strongly (see SI for proof.) Star-like designs are successful because the central node in a star
acts as a cascade blocker while keeping the average distance in the star short (∼ 2). Only for sufficiently
low r, the Cliques, Connected Cliques and Connected Stars designs are superior to the Stars design. For
such values of r efficiency is the dominant contributor to fitness. High weighting for efficiency benefits
the former designs where efficiency can be 1 by constructing a fully connected (complete) graph (see SI
for analytic results.) In the star design efficiency is lower, reaching ∼ 12 (when all nodes are placed in a
single large star.)
It has been long conjectured that cells provide dark networks with high resilience. Indeed, this is
probably the reason why we found that dark networks have higher fitnesses than other networks. But
cells also reduce the efficiency of a network since they isolate nodes from each other. To rigorously
determine the net effect of cells, we compare the ER design (random graphs) to the Connected Stars
design. ER is a strict subset of Connected Stars but only Connected Stars has cells. Therefore it is
7notable that Connected Stars has a higher fitness than ER, often significantly so. Indeed, cells must be
the cause of higher fitness because cells are the only feature in Connected Stars that ER lacks.
4.2 Properties of Optimal Networks
Many properties of the optimal networks such as resilience, efficiency and edge density show rapid phase
transitions as r is changed. For example, in the Cliques design when r < 0.5 the optimal network has
high density that maximizes efficiency, whereas for r > 0.5 it is sparse and maximizes resilience (Fig. 5.)
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Figure 5. Average degree in the optimal configuration of each design. At r = 0.49 (A) the
optimization prefers networks that have high efficiency while at r = 0.51 (B) the preference is for
resilience. In (B) the average degree diminishes monotonically to compensate for increasing cascade
risk. In (A) most designs have a threshold τ at which they jump back to a completely-connected graph
because structural cascade resilience becomes too expensive in terms of efficiency.
Intuition may suggest that the networks growmore sparse as cascade risk grows. Instead, the trend was
non-monotonic (Fig. 5.) For τ ≫ 0 and r < 0.5 Cliques, Connected Cliques and Connected Stars became
denser, instead of sparser, and for them the most sparse networks were formed in the intermediate values
of τ where the optimal networks achieve both relatively high resilience and high efficiency. At higher τ
values, when r < 0.5 it pays to sacrifice resilience because fitness is increased when efficiency is made
larger through an equal or lesser sacrifice in resilience. The Stars design does not show a transition at
r = 0.5 because it is hard to increase efficiency with this design.
4.3 Multi-objective Optimization
A complementary perspective on each design is found from its Pareto frontier of resilience and efficiency
(Fig. 6.) Typically a design is dominant in a part of the Resilience-Efficiency plane but not all of it.
The Stars and Connected Stars designs can access most of the high resilience-low efficiency region. In
contrast, the Cliques and Connected Cliques can make networks in the medium resilience-high efficiency
regions.
The sharp phase transitions discussed earlier are seen clearly: along most of the frontiers, if we trace
a point while decreasing resilience, there is a threshold at which a small sacrifice in resilience gives a
major gain of efficiency. More generally, consider the points where the frontier is smooth. By taking two
nearby networks on the frontier one can define a rate of change of efficiency with respect to resilience:∣∣∆W
∆R
∣∣. The ratio can be used to optimize the network without using the parameter r. When ∣∣∆W∆R ∣∣≫ 1
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Figure 6. The Pareto frontiers of various network designs (τ = 0.4). The configurations of the
Connected Stars design dominate over other designs when the network must achieve high resilience.
However, designs based on cliques are dominant when high efficiency is required. Several designs show
sharp transitions where at a small sacrifice of efficiency it is possible to achieve large increases in
cascade resilience.
the network optimizer should choose to reduce to the resilience of the network in order to achieve great
gains in efficiency; when
∣∣∆W
∆R
∣∣≪ 1 efficiency should be sacrificed to improve resilience.
5 Discussion
The analysis above considered both empirical networks and synthetic ones. The latter were constructed to
achieve structural cascade resilience and efficiency. In contrast, in many empirical networks the structure
emerges through an unplanned growth process or results from optimization to factors such as cost rather
than blocking cascades. Without exception the synthetic networks showed higher fitness values despite
the fact that they were based on very simple designs. This suggests that network optimization can
significantly improve the fitness and cascade resilience of networks. It means that such an optimization
process can indeed be an effective method for designing a variety of networks and for protecting existing
networks from cascades.
9Many empirical networks also have power-law degree distributions [26]. Unfortunately, this feature
significantly diminishes their cascade resilience: the resulting high-degree hubs make the networks ex-
tremely vulnerable to cascades once τ is slightly larger than 0 [1, 2].
In some successful synthetic networks the density of edges increased when the cascade risk τ was high.
This phenomenon has interesting parallels in non-violent social movements which are often organized
openly rather than as secret underground cells even under conditions of severe state repression [37]. This
openness greatly facilitates recruitment and advocacy, justifying the additional risk to the participants,
just like the sacrifice of resilience to gain higher efficiency is justified under r < 0.5 conditions.
There are other important applications of this work, such as the design of power distribution systems.
For power networks, the definition of resilience and efficiency will need to be changed. It would also be
necessary to use much broader designs and optimization under design constraints such as cost. Further-
more, this work could also be adapted to domains of increasing concern such as financial credit networks,
whose structure may make them vulnerable to bankruptcies [14, 15].
6 Methods
6.1 Measuring Resilience
Research on graph theory has led to the development of a variety of metrics of robustness or resilience [38]
but here unlike in many other studies the interest is in resilience to cascades and not to disconnection.
One particularly important and well-characterized class of cascades are those that start at a single node
and then spread probabilistically to neighboring nodes possibly reaching a large fraction of the network,
termed the SIR model and percolation [26]. Under this model, resilience can be defined based on the
expected size of the surviving network:
R(G) = 1−
1
n− 1
E[extent of a cascade] , (3)
where “extent of a cascade” refers to the ultimate number of new cases created by a single failed node.
For simplicity, cascades are assumed to start at all nodes with uniform probability.
6.2 Measuring Efficiency
For many applications the distance between pairs of nodes in the network is one of the most important
determinants of the network’s efficiency (see e.g. [36,39,40].) When nodes are separated by short distances
they can easily communicate and distribute resources to each other. This idea motivates the following
“distance-attenuated reach” metric. For all pairs of nodes u, v ∈ V , weigh each pair by the inverse of its
internal distance (the number of edges in the shortest path from u to v) taken to power g:
W (G) =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
u∈V
∑
v∈Vr{u}
1
d(u, v)g
, (4)
Normalization by n(n − 1) ensures that 0 ≤ W (G) ≤ 1, and only the complete graph achieves 1. As
usual, for any node v with no path to u, set 1d(u,v)g = 0. The parameter g, “connectivity attenuation“
represents the rate at which distance decreases the connectivity between nodes. In the experiments above
g = 1.
Supporting Information below contains detailed information about the optimization methodology, the
simulation process, and sensitivity as well as rigorous justification of certain claims.
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Supporting Information
A Resilience and Efficiency of Empirical Networks
It is interesting to compare the empirical networks to each other in their efficiency and resilience (Fig. 7).
Note that FTP and 9/11 networks are not the most resilient, but they strike a good balance between
resilience and efficiency. The advantages of the two networks over other networks are not marginal,
implying that their advantages in fitness are not sensitive to the choice of r. Of course, they are optimized
for particular combinations of r and τ , and will no longer be very successful outside that range. For
instance, in the range of high r and high τ networks with multiple connected components would have
higher fitness because they are able to isolate cascades in one component.
Figure 7. Resilience and Efficiency of the real networks. The fittest networks are not always
the most resilient.
B Resilience and Efficiency of Weighted Networks
In some networks, each edge (u, v) carries a distance weight Duv > 0. The smaller the distance, the closer
the connection between u and v. To compute the fitness of those networks, we now introduce generaliza-
tions of resilience and efficiency. Those reduce to the original definitions for unweighted networks when
Duv = 1, while capturing the effects of weights in the weighted networks.
The original definition of resilience was built on a percolation model where the failure of any node
leads to the failure of its neighbor with probability τ . In the weighted network more distant nodes
should be less likely to spread the cascade. Thus we make the probability of cascade through (u, v) to be
min(τ/Duv, 1).
The efficiency was originally defined as the sum of all-pairs inverse geodesic distances, normalized by
the efficiency of the complete graph. In the weighted network, both the distance and the normalization
must be generalized. To compute the distance d(u, v) we consider the weights on the edges D and apply
Dijkstra’s algorithm to find the shortest path. Normalization too must consider D because a weighted
graph with sufficiently small distances could outperform the complete graph (if all the edges of the latter
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have Dij = 1.) Therefore, we weigh the efficiency by the harmonic mean H of the edges (E) of the graph:
W (G) =
H(G)
n(n− 1)
∑
u∈V
∑
v∈Vr{u}
1
d(u, v)g
, (5)
where
H(G) =
|E|∑
(u,v)∈E
(
1
Duv
)g .
The harmonic mean ensures that for any D, the complete graph has W (G) = 1.
Having defined generalized resilience and efficiency we can evaluate the standard approach to dark
network, which represents them as binary graphs Duv ∈ {0, 1}, rather than as weighted graphs. The
former approach is often taken because the information about dark networks is limited and insufficient
to estimate edge weights.
Fortunately, in two cases, the 9/11 network and the 11M network [23, 28] the weights could be
estimated. The 9/11 data labels nodes as either facilitators or hijackers. Hijackers must train together
and thus should tend to have a closer relationship. Thus set Duv = 2, 1, 0.5 if the pair u, v includes zero,
one or two hijackers, respectively. The 11M network is already weighted (Zuv = 1, 2, 3 . . . ) based on the
number of functions each contact (u, v) serves (friendship, kin, joint training etc.) We mapped those
weights to D by Duv = 2/Zuv. In both networks the transformation was so that the weakest ties have
weight 2, giving them greater distance than in the binary network, while the strongest ties are shorter
than in the binary network.
Figure 8 compares the fitnesses, resiliences and efficiencies of the weighted and binary representations.
It shows that for both networks, the fitnesses of the binary representation lies within 0.15 of the fitness
of the weighted representation and for some τ much closer. The efficiency measures are even more close
(within 0.05.) The behavior of resilience is intriguing: for the 9/11 network the weighted representation
shows more gradual decline as a function of cascade risk when compared to the binary representation. For
the 11M network the decline is actually slightly more sharp in the weighted representation. Structurally,
the 11M network has a center (measured by betweenness centrality) of tightly knit-nodes (very short
distances), while the 9/11 network is more sparse at its center, increasing its cascade resilience. This
effect explains the direction of the error in the binary representation. Based on those two examples, it
appears that the binary representation does not have a systematic bias, and may even underestimate the
fitness of dark networks.
12
Figure 8. Fitness, Resilience and Efficiency of two dark networks (r = 0.51), comparing
binary and weighted representations. The binary representation matches the weighted
representation within 0.15, and typically closer.
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C Network Designs
We considered networks on n = 180 nodes constructed through 6 simple designs, chosen both based on
empirical findings (see e.g. [41,42]) as well as the possibility of analytic tractability in some cases. When
more data becomes available on dark networks, it will become possible to extract additional subgraphs
with statistical validity.
Three of the designs are based on identical “cells”: each cell is either (a) a clique (a complete graph),
(b) a star (with a central node called “leader”), and (c) a cycle (nodes connected in a ring). Each of
these have a single parameter, k - the number of nodes in the cell. Recent research suggests that under
certain assumptions constructing networks from identical cells is optimal [43]. Let us also consider n-node
graphs consisting of (d) randomly-connected cliques (sometimes termed “cavemen”), and (e) randomly-
connected stars, in both cases according to probability p . Consider also (f) the simpler and well-studied
Erdos-Renyi (ER) random graph with probability p (see figure in main text). By considering different
structures for the cells we determine which of those structures provides the best performance.
The above palette of designs is sufficient for the current study’s purpose of introducing an approach
which could be applied to different domains, as well as begin constructing a theory to address cascade
resilience. There are surely applications where if the objective is to design cascade-resilient networks,
one ought to both reject some of the designs above for application-specific reasons and also to introduce
additional designs. The task of taking other designs can be done by merely changing the computer
program for generating the networks. Fruitful future research in cascade-resilient network is to attack
the most general problem of finding the best network on n nodes. Unfortunately, this search space is
exponential and probably non-convex.
Research on social networks indicates that resilience and efficiency might be just two of several design
criteria that also include e.g. “information-processing requirements”, that impose additional constraints
on network designs [18]. In the original context “information-processing” refers to the need to have ties
between individuals involved in a particular task, when the task has high complexity. Each individual
might have a unique set of expertise into which all the other agents must tap directly. Generalizing
from sociology, such “functional constraints” might considerably limit the flexibility in constructing re-
silient and efficient networks. Such functional constraints could be addressed by looking at a palette of
network designs which already incorporate such constraints or using innovative techniques from convex
optimization [13].
The solution to the optimization problem is found by setting each of the parameters k (and when
possible p) to various values. Each design D has “configurations” CD1 , C
D
2 , . . . each specifying the values
of the parameters. Each configuration CDi is inputted to a program that generates an ensemble of 1− 10
networks, whose average performance provides an estimate of the fitness of CDi . The number of networks
was 10 for networks with parameter p because there is higher variability between instances. The coefficient
of variation (CV) in the fitness of the sample networks was monitored to ensure that the average is a
reliable measure of performance. Typically CV was < 0.2 except near phase transitions of connectivity
and percolation.
Optimization was performed using grid search. Alternative methods (e.g. Nelder-Mead) were consid-
ered but grid search was chosen despite its computational cost because it suffers no convergence problems
even in the presence of noise (present due to variations in topology and contagion extent), and collects
data useful for sensitivity analysis and multi-objective optimization. The sampling grid was as follows.
In designs consisting of cells of size k, cell size was set to all integer values in [1, 180]. If k did not divide
180, a cell of size < k was added to ensure that the number of nodes in the graph is 180. The number
of nodes is 180 because 180 is a highly-composite number and so it offers many networks of equally-sized
cells. In general, normalization by n in the definitions of resilience and efficiency ensures that even when
the number of nodes is tripled the effect of network size on fitness is very small for the above designs
(around ±0.05 in numerical experiments). In designs containing a parameter of connectivity p, it was set
to all multiples of 0.05 in [0, 1], with some extra points added to better sample phase transitions. The
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grid search algorithm results are readily used to compute the Pareto frontier using the ǫ-balls method [44]
(ǫ = 0.01).
The resilience metric is most easily computed by simulation where a node is selected at random to
be “infected”, and the simulation is run until all nodes are in states S or R, and none is in state I. In
the simplest version of the SIR cascade model, which we adopt, each node in the graph can be in one
of three states “susceptible”, “infected” and “removed” designated S, I and R respectively (these names
are borrowed from epidemiology). Time is described in uniform discrete steps. A node in S state at time
t stays in this state, unless a neighbor “infects” the node, causing it to move to state I at time t + 1.
Specifically, a node in state S at time t has probability τ of turning to I state at time t + 1 for each
adjacent node in state I at time t. Finally, a node in I state at time t always becomes R at time t+ 1.
Once in state R, the node remains there for all future times. It is possible to consider an alternate model
where the rate of transition I → R takes more than one time step, but adding this effect would mostly
serve to increase the probability of transmission, which is already parametrized by τ [6, 45].
A cascade/contagion that starts at a single node would run for up to n steps, but usually much fewer
since typically τ < 1 and/or the graph is not connected. To achieve good estimate of the average extent,
the procedure was replicated 40 times, and then continued as long as necessary to achieve an error of
under ±0.5node with a 95% confidence interval [46].
An analytic computation of the cascade extent metric was investigated. It is possible in theory because
the contagion is a Markov process with states in the superset of the set of nodes, 3n. Unfortunately, such
a state space is impractically large. When G is a tree, then an analytic expression exists1, and it might
be feasible when the treewidth is small [6, 47]. However, for many graph designs the tree approximation
is not suitable. Another possible approach is to represent the contagion approximately as a system of
differential equations which can be integrated numerically [48] . These possibilities were not pursued
since the simulation approach could be applied to all graphs, while the errors of the analytic approaches
are possibly quite large.
D Continuity of Fitness in r
We now justify the claim that fitness is continuous in r. In fact, we will prove the stronger property of
Lipschitz-continuity. Notice that the claim is not about the continuity of fitness of a single configuration
as a function of r but rather that:
Claim: f(r) = maxG∈G F (G, r) is Lipschitz-continuous for r ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: The argument constructs a bound on the change in f in terms of the change in r. Consider an
optimal configuration C1 of a design for r = r1 and let its fitness be f1 = F (C1, r1) (there is slight abuse
of notation since C is a configuration, whose fitness is the average fitness of an ensemble of graphs).
Observation 1: consider the fitness of C1 at r = r2. Because C1 is fixed and the metrics are bounded
(0 ≤ R ≤ 1 and 0 ≤W ≤ 1), the fitness change is bounded by the change in r:
|f1 − F (C1, r2)| = |r1R(C1) + (1− r1)W (C1)
−r2R(C1)− (1− r2)W (C1)|
= |(r1 − r2)R(C1)− (r1 − r2)W (C1)|
≤ |r1 − r2| .
Observation 2: let C2 be the optimal configuration for r = r2 and let f2 = F (C2, r2). Since C2 is optimal
for r = r2 it satisfies: f2 ≥ f(C1, r2), and so −f2 ≤ −F (C1, r2). It follows that f1 − f2 ≤ f1 − F (C1, r2).
Take the absolute value of the right hand side and apply Observation 1 to get the bound: f1 − f2 ≤
1Specifically, the mean contagion size is 1+
pG′0(1)
1−pG′
1
(1)
, where G0(x) generates the degree distribution and G1(x) =
G′0(x)
G′
0
(1)
generates the probability of arrival to a node [6].
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|r1 − r2|.
Observation 3: applying the argument of Observations 1&2 but reversing the roles of C1 and C2 implies
that f2 − f1 ≤ |r1 − r2|.
Observations 2&3 give |f1 − f2| ≤ |r1 − r2|, proving the result.
E Additional Performance Results
A plot of the fitness of various designs is in Fig. 9. Notice that for r = 0.25 Cliques outperform Stars.
The resilience and efficiency are in Fig. 10 and 11.
(a) r = 0.25 (b) r = 0.49
(c) r = 0.51 (d) r = 0.75
Figure 9. Fitness of the optimal configuration. For very low r Cliques outperform Stars.
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(a) r = 0.49 (b) r = 0.51
Figure 10. Resilience of the optimal design.
(a) r = 0.49 (b) r = 0.51
Figure 11. Efficiency of the optimal design.
The success of the Stars design could be analyzed more qualitatively. The fitness function combines
resilience R(G) which decreases when the graph becomes more strongly connected, and efficiency W (G)
which decreases when the graph becomes more sparse. The optimality of the star-based designs is due to
a good trade-off between R and W : the central node in each cell (its “leader”) provides a good firewall
against cascades because in each cell most pairs are separated by distance of 2, but this separation reduces
efficiency only modestly. In the Cliques design the separation is 1 (too short for resilience), and in the
Cycles design it is too long (∼a quarter of cell size k).
Mathematically, the existence of a non-trivial solution is due to the different functional relationships.
To first-order approximation, efficiency decreases inversely with average distance,Θ
(
1
avg distanceg
)
while
cascade extent decreases exponentially, Θ
(
τavg distance
)
, for τ < 1 assuming a bounded number of
alternative paths). For example, for the star design R = O(1 − τ2) and W = O(2−g) as n = k →
∞. Therefore, the optimal network’s structure exploits the exponential decrease in cascades without
sacrificing too much efficiency. In the range τ ∈ [0.2, 0.7] and r ≈ 0.5, an average distance of ≈ 2, as in
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the star graph, might be optimal (cf. [36]).
F Monotonicity of Fitness
Proposition: Let f(τ) be the highest attainable fitness within a fixed network design G, for cascade
probability τ :
f(τ) = max
G∈G

rR(G, τ) + (1 − r)W (G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F (G,τ)


Then f(τ) is a non-increasing function of τ .
Proof of Proposition: The proof relies on the simple claim that resilience of networks does not increase
when τ increases [49]. The claim is equivalent to the result that for a given graph G increasing τ does
not decrease the expected extent of cascades. The remainder is almost trivial: we need to show that
when the fitness of all the points on the space (all graphs) has been made smaller or kept the same (by
increasing τ), the new maximum value would not be greater than in the old space. Rigorously, assume
by contradiction that τ+ > τ and fitness increased, namely:
f(τ+) > f(τ) . (6)
Let G∗τ+ , G
∗
τ by any two optimal networks for τ+ and τ , respectively, namely:
G∗τ+ ∈ argmax
G∈G
[rR(G, τ+) + (1 − r)W (G)]
G∗τ ∈ argmax
G∈G
[rR(G, τ) + (1− r)W (G)] .
By optimality of G∗τ at τ get that it must be at least as good at τ as G
∗
τ+ :
F (G∗τ , τ)− F (G
∗
τ+ , τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡∆
≥ 0 . (7)
The claim implies that:
R(G∗τ+ , τ) ≥ R(G
∗
τ+ , τ+) . (8)
Expanding ∆:
∆ = F (G∗τ , τ) −
[
rR(G∗τ+ , τ) + (1− r)W (G
∗
τ+)
]
≤ F (G∗τ , τ) − rR(G
∗
τ+ , τ+)− (1 − r)W (G
∗
τ+) by (8)
= F (G∗τ , τ) − F (G
∗
τ+ , τ+)
< 0 by the hypothesis (6).
This contradicts Ineq. 7. The argument is easy to generalize. One could apply this method to the
parameter g of attenuation, showing that fitness is non-increasing when attenuation is increased.
G Analytic Results
It is easy to analytically derive the values of the resilience, efficiency (and hence fitness) functions for
certain simple designs: the Cycles and the Stars designs. These are useful to gain deeper insight into the
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effect of parameters. Recall that n is the number of nodes and k is the number of nodes per cell. For
k = 1, in both designs R = 1 and W = 0. When k ≥ 2, it is easy to verify that for the Cycle design:
R(n, k, τ) = 1−
1
n− 1
[
2τ
1− τk−1
1− τ
− (k − 1)τk
]
W (n, k, g) =
1
n− 1


1
( k
2
)g
+ 2
∑k
2
−1
j=1
1
jg k even
2
∑k−1
2
j=1
1
jg k odd
and for the Stars design:
R(n, k, τ) = 1−
1− 1k
n− 1
[2 + τ(k − 2)] τ
W (n, k, g) =
1− 1k
n− 1
[
2 + 2−g(k − 2)
]
.
These expressions are not readily useful for continuous optimization since k is discrete, but they can be
used to identify phase transitions. Thus, they help inform optimization for designs where no analytic
expression is available. The ER and Cliques designs are also analytically tractable (see e.g. [34] for
expected cascade extent).
In the Stars design, when R and W are weighted equally (r = 12 ), fitness takes a relatively simple
form: F = 12 +
1
2
1− 1
k
n−1
[
2(1− τ) + (2−g − τ2)(k − 2)
]
. This implies that increasing cell size k, for k large,
improves fitness iff 2−g − τ2 > 0. Hence the optimal configuration has one cell (k = n), until a threshold
near τ = 2−g/2 (for g = 1, approximately 0.71). This agrees with the findings in Fig. 12. Also, the rate of
change in fitness with respect to τ , dFdτ =
1− 1
k
n−1 [−2− 2τ(k − 2)], is always negative, as expected on more
general grounds (see sec. F). It is linear in τ (because it is a tree graph) but superlinear in k (because of
the mutual hazard induced by adding nodes to cells.)
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(a) r = 0.25 (b) r = 0.49
(c) r = 0.51 (d) r = 0.75
Figure 12. Cell size k in the optimal configuration of each design. Cell size makes many sharp
transitions.
H Configuration of the Optimal Design
As τ is varied, the optimal configuration changes. This section shows the resulting changes in the values
of the parameters k (cell size) and p (connectivity). In other words, it indicates how each of the designs
ought to be configured to attain optimal fitness, as a function of resilience weighting, r, and cascade
probability, τ .
The cell size parameter k is non-monotonic for various designs when r = 0.49 (Fig. 12). For example,
for the Connected Cliques design, at low contagion risk (τ < 0.1), k is high (comparable to the size of
the network, i.e. k → n), then it falls to a small number. At high contagion risk (τ > 0.6) the network
is again highly connected again with k → n. Thus for τ → 1, the optimal network is the fully-connected
graph.
In general, designs involving both the p and k parameters show an interplay between the two (Fig. 13).
For example, in the Connected Stars design under r < 0.5 there are two phase-transitions in connectivity
p: as τ increases at τ → τ∗l ≈ 0.1 it transitions from a connected graph to disconnected cells, and at
τ → τ∗u ≈ 0.7 back to full connectivity. If r > 0.5 the second transition is extinguished. The data
requires care to interpret. For example, in the Connected Stars design τ ∈ [0.1, 0.65], when r > 0.5 the
fluctuations in the p are noise because there is a single cell and a single cell leader (k = n), and so the
parameter p has no effect. For sensitivity analysis see section I.
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(a) r = 0.25 (b) r = 0.49
(c) r = 0.51 (d) r = 0.75
Figure 13. Connectivity p in the optimal configuration of each design. Non-monotonic trends
reflect structural transitions and sometimes also interplay with cell size.
I Sensitivity Analysis
It is desirable to determine how much variability exists within the optimal parameter values. Only if the
variability is low the optimal configuration provides valuable information for network design. As proxy
of robustness of the estimates, consider the space of configurations whose fitness ≥ 0.95 of the fitness of
the optimal solution. The robustness of a parameter is measured by the parameter’s standard deviation
within this space (the unbiased estimate).
The results are in Figs. 14,15,17,16. Overall, as one would expect, the properties are more variable
near the transition point r = 0.5, as compared to r values away from r = 0.5. Moreover, variability is
high within each design whenever the design undergoes a phase transition, since multiple different phases
have nearly equal fitness. Another source of variance is found in designs with two parameters. These are
more variable than designs with a single parameter because the former can reproduce some of the same
graphs with many different parameter settings - the parameters have non-orthogonal effects. Finally,
designs with low fitness for all configurations (like Cycles) show high variability since all configurations
show uniform low performance.
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(a) r = 0.25 (b) r = 0.49
(c) r = 0.51 (d) r = 0.75
Figure 14. Standard deviation in resilience within the top 5% of solutions.
(a) r = 0.25 (b) r = 0.49
(c) r = 0.51 (d) r = 0.75
Figure 15. Standard deviation in efficiency within the top 5% of solutions.
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(a) r = 0.25 (b) r = 0.49
(c) r = 0.51 (d) r = 0.75
Figure 16. Standard deviation in cell size k of the top 5% of solutions.
(a) r = 0.25 (b) r = 0.49
(c) r = 0.51 (d) r = 0.75
Figure 17. Standard deviation in connectivity p of the top 5% of solutions.
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